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Abstract 
Setting a bid markup strategy is a very difficult task. Nevertheless, it is important to construction 
firms or consulting engineering companies because the development of successful bidding strategies is 
a key factor to their survival in business. Based on the two bidding criteria of the conditional profit 
ratio and the work force continuity, this short paper first presents the explicit expression of an 
equilibrium bid markup strategy in procurement auctions. However, the two bidding criteria conflict 
with each other and tradeoffs must be made. To make tradeoffs between the two bidding criteria, a new 
bid markup selection making model is then developed by Cobb-Douglas utility function. The model 
generalizes the classical expected profit model in the sense that the latter's objective function is only a 
special case of the former. The result shows that the relative importance of a bidding criterion to 
another has significant effect on the selection of the equilibrium bid markup strategy. 
 




Selecting a successful bid markup or bid price is not only very important to bidders, but also a key 
factor to the survival of a construction firm or a consulting engineering company. To assist bidders in 
selection of a most preferred bid markup, Seydel and Olson (1990) present a method in which three bid 
criteria --- profitability, risk exposure, and work force continuity --- are considered based upon the 
merging of stochastic bidding models with the analytical hierarchy process (AHP). Later, two new bid 
criteria, called the conditional positive profit ratio and the expected positive profit ratio, are introduced 
by Lai et al. (2002). By using the newly introduced criteria, Lai et al. (2002) propose three two-
criterion decision models and a single criterion decision model in the determination of the bidder's 
most preferred markup level1. These two papers use discrete numerical examples to demonstrate how 
to select the most preferred bid markup. However, explicit expression of an equilibrium bid markup 
strategy is left open in a continuous setting, which motivates the research of this short paper. 
Traditionally, a decision objective function with two bid criteria is often analyzed in auction theory. 
For example, the expected profit decision objective function equals the product of the profit and the 
winning probability2, and the expected utility decision objective function is equal to the utility (or 
profit's function) multiplied by the winning probability3. Thus, these two-criterion decision objective 
functions are implicitly assumed that bidders have the same preference for the two bid criteria (say, the 
winning probability and the profit). However, Seydel and Olson (1990) mention that the expected 
profit maximization may or may not lead to an optimal decision when the decision maker's total utility 
is considered, depending upon the importance of the profit relative to the other bid criteria. Often bid 
criteria that are relevant to bidders' decision, such as the profit, the risk reduction, the capital exposure, 
and the work force continuity, mutually conflict. Typically, as bid markup increases (decreases, 
                                                          
1 Wang et al. (2011) explain the three bidding criteria by demand surplus and supply surplus. 
2 See e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1987), Milgrom (1989), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson 
(1981), Kim (2007) and Sohangir S. and Seyyedi (2011).  
3 See e.g., Matthews (1983, 1987), Maskin and Riley (1984), Choi et al. (2008) and Chang (2011). 
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respectively), the work force continuity measured by the winning probability decreases (increases, 
respectively) gradually while the profit increases (decreases, respectively) gradually. As a result, a 
change in bid markup strategy leads to inverse changes in the work force continuity and the profit, and 
tradeoffs must be made. This is another research motivation in this short paper. 
To reflect the bidders' reference over each of two bid criteria, or the relative importance of one bid 
criterion to another, this short paper adopts the Cobb-Douglas utility function to make tradeoffs 
between the work force continuity and the conditional profit ratio. The reason for this is that, in Cobb-
Douglas utility function x1
αx2
β (where x1 and x2 are consumption of the two goods), the relative size of α 
to β indicates the relative importance of the goods to consumers. Thus, a new bid markup selection 
making model is developed, and it generalizes the classical expected profit model in the sense that the 
latter's objective function is only a special case of the former. The result shows that the relative 
importance of a bidding criterion to another has significant effect on the selection of the equilibrium 
bid markup strategy. 
This short paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the model. Section III derives 
equilibrium bid markup strategy under the two-criterion decision model proposed by Lai et al. (2002).  
Based on the Cobb-Douglas utility function, Section IV develops a new decision making model. 
Section V concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a case of procurement auctions. The procurer has a single indivisible project 
contract to procure. The bidder submitting the lowest bid markup gets the project contract. 
As in Lai et al. (2002), denote a bid price by B, the true cost by C (a random variable), and 
the estimated cost by Ce. A bid markup denoted by M is defined as the ratio of the bid price to 
the estimated cost for the project, i.e., M = B/Ce. Let π
-, π+ and π be the ratios of the negative 
profit, the positive profit and the profit to the estimated cost, respectively. FL(.) and fL(.) are the 
probability distribution function and the corresponding density function of the lowest 
competitive bid markup, respectively. 
Given a bid markup M, the conditional negative profit ratio in Lai et al. (2002) (called the 
conditional loss ratio and denoted by E[loss|win] in Seydel and Olson (1990)) is  
 
                         [ ] ,
C B e e
C B




                                                         (1) 
 
where P(C) is the probability distribution of the true cost for a given project. 
Lai et al. (2002) extend (1) to the case of continuous random variable X = C/Ce 
  
                                  [ ] ,
M
E win x M f x dx
                                                      (2) 
 
and propose a new bid criterion called the conditional positive profit ratio 
 
                                [ ] ,ME win M x f x dx 
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where F(x) and f(x) are the probability distribution function and the density function of 
random variable X = C/Ce, evaluated at x, respectively. Then, Lai et al. (2002) prove that the 
conditional profit ratio, E[π|win], satisfies 
 
                 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]E win E win E win M E X                                        (4) 
 
where E[X] is the expectation value of ratio X = C/Ce. 
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Suppose that bid markup M varies uniformly over some finite interval, Seydel and Olson 
(1990) demonstrate how to discretize the continuum in order to select a bid markup maximizing 
the expected profit ratio 
[ ] [ ] ( )E E win P win  ,                                                       (5) 
 
where P(win) is the probability of winning the project contract. As one numerical example, the 
example in Seydel and Olson (1990) is used by Lai et al. (2002) to demonstrate and compare 
their models. 
Sequentially, we abstract mathematically the expected profit ratio maximization model in 
Seydel and Olson (1990) (called a two-criterion decision making model with the conditional 
profit ratio and the work force continuity in Lai et al. (2002)), and mention its shortage. By (4) 
and the definition of FL(.), we have 
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i.e., E[π] is concave in M. In other words, Seydel and Olson (1990) and Lai et al. (2002) can 
certainly select the most preferred bid markup in model (5) under the assumption that the bid 
markup varies uniformly over some finite interval. In the sense, although Seydel and Olson 
(1990) and Lai et al. (2002) obtain some interesting results, it is unclear whether or not those 
results hold for a general probability distribution function.  
Practically, estimated cost Ce is a constant, and true cost C is a random variable because of 
future factor price's uncertainty, and bid price B is a decision variable depending on C. As C 
increases, B also increases to make a profit, i.e., M=B/Ce is increasing in X=C/Ce. Therefore, 
this short paper assumes that decision variable M is the increasing function of ratio X, which is 
different from that in both Seydel and Olson (1990) and Lai et al. (2002). 
Suppose that the procurer faces n bidders. For each bidder i=1, 2,…, n, bidder i values the 
ratio of the true cost to the estimated cost at an amount Xi, known only to him. Because the 
other bidders don't know about this value, it appears to them to be a random variable. It is 
assumed that the bidders' ratios of the true cost to the estimated cost are independent across all 
bidders, and that the ratios are drawn from the same distribution function F(x). That is, each 
bidder agrees that the prior probability that Xi is less than x is given by F(x). F(x) has a positive, 
continuously differentiable density function f(x)4. 
As in Seydel and Olson (1990), a bidding company can examine its historical data for the 
same kind of project, and then roughly know that the true cost is in a finite interval. Let us 
denote the interval by [a, b] satisfying F(a)=0 and F(b)=1. 
In this short paper, we focus on the case of continuous random variable X with general 
probability distribution function F(x), and present a Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid markup 
strategy M(X) to bidders. Because all bidders' ratios X are drawn from the common probability 
distribution, it is natural to study the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid markup strategy. 
                                                          
4 The positive feature of density function f(x) plays an important role in deducing the equilibrium bid 
markup strategy. 
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M(.) is called a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid markup strategy, if for each bidder i 
with Xi, bid markup M(Xi) is a best response to the other bidders' bid markups { M(Xj)}j≠i. 
 
3. Equilibrium bid markup strategy 
 
When bidders make decision with two criteria --- the conditional profit ratio, E[π|win], and 
the work force continuity measured by winning probability, P(win)5, according to Seydel and 
Olson (1990), each bidder's objective is to maximize his expected profit ratio E[π], 
  
max{ [ | ] ( )}E win P win                                                (7) 
 
Suppose that all but bidder i follow the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid markup M(.), 
and that bidder i with Xi bids an amount of M(t). Since M(.) is the increasing function of X, then 
the winning probability of bidder i is 
 
  1
( )  = Prob( )[ ( ) ( )],
              = Prob( > ,  )
              = 1 ( )




P win win M X M t j i







                           (8) 
 
where G(x)= (1−F(x)) n−1. 
If bidder i wins the project, the profit ratio earned from the project is the difference between 
the bid markup and the ratio of the true cost to the estimated cost. Thus, we have 
 
[ | ] ( ( ) iE win M t X                                                     (9) 
 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7), we have 
 
max{( ( ) ) ( )}i
t
M t X G t                                                   (10) 
 
By differentiating the objective function in (10) with respect to t, we yield 
 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )iM t G t M t X g t                                                (11)  
 
where g(x)= Gˊ(x). At a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, M(Xi) is the best reply to the 
other bidders' bid markups { M(Xj)}j≠i. Thus, (11) equals zero at t= Xi. Hence, we have the 
following differential equation: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .




g X g X
M X M X X
G X G X
                                        (12) 
 
In the equilibrium, the bidder with the lowest true cost submits the lowest bid markup and 
wins the project. Thus, it is not optimal for bidder i to bid an amount M(b)>b. Meanwhile, each 
bid can not be less than the true cost. Therefore, M(b)=b. It is easy to check that 
                                                          
5 To ensure continuity and avoid layoffs, bidding firms must do what is necessary to increase the 
probability of winning for each project; as firms lower their markup, this probability, and the assurance 
of work continuity, increase; in this manner, bid acceptance probabilities serve as indicators of 
continuity (Seydel and Olson, 1990). 
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M X X dy
G X
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is a solution of differential equation (12) satisfying the boundary condition of M(b)=b. 
(13) is merely a necessary condition for M(Xi) to maximize E[π], but we claim that it is also 
sufficient, given that the other bidders follow M(.). In fact, by (10) we have 
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Noting that G(x)= (1−F(x)) n−1, then we have 
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regardless of t < Xi or t > Xi. Hence, (13) is the sufficient condition for M(Xi) to maximize E[π]. 
Noting that the bidders' true cost is symmetric (i.e., the bidders' true cost has the identical 
distribution), we have the following proposition.  
Proposition 1 In the procurement auction, when bidders make decision based on model (7), a 
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i.e., M(X) is actually increasing in ratio X, which is in accordance with practice. 
Then, we can make a comparison between the result in Proposition 1 and the correspondingly 
discrete result in Seydel and Olson (1990). Table 1 is taken from the first column and the fourth 
column of Table 2 in Seydel and Olson (1990). 
 
Table 1. Expected Profit Ratios 
M(%) 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 
E[π](%) −15.31 −9.38 −4.69 −1.25 0.94 1.88* 1.56 0.00 
 
Table 1 shows that the expected profit ratio E[π] achieves its maximum at M=115%, since E[π] 
increases gradually over interval [90%, 115%] and decreases gradually over interval [115%, 125%]. 
It implies from (14), however, that decision variable M depends on random variable X. In 
other words, given a realization of random variable X, there is a corresponding bid markup to 
maximize the bidding objective function in (7), i.e., the optimal bid markup changes with the 
realization of random variable X. 
Remark 1 (14) implies that the equilibrium bid markup depends on not only the realization 
of X, but also the distribution F(.) of X. Since 0<[1−F(y)]/[1−F (X)]<1(X<y< b), then the degree 
of “markup” (the amount by which M is more than X) depends on the number of the bidders and 
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approaches to 0 (i.e., M approaches to X) as the number of the bidders becomes more and more 
larger. Therefore, competition is unprofitable to bidders, but profitable to the procurer. 
 
4. New model 
 
In model (7), as the bid markup increases, the conditional profit ratio increases, while the 
work force continuity decreases. The two criteria of earning the conditional profit ratio (by 
setting the bid markup high enough) and making work force continuity (by setting the bid 
markup low enough) conflict with each other, and tradeoffs must be made. 
To solve the above tradeoff problem, we evaluate the bidder's equilibrium bid markup by the 
following maximization problem: 
 
   max{ ( ) ( ) }, 0, 0, 1
t
M t X G t
                                    (15) 
 
where α and β are the weights of the conditional profit ratio and the work force continuity, 
respectively. The role of weights α and β serves to express the importance of the conditional 
profit ratio relative to the work force continuity. Weights α and β can also provide useful 
information, since they indicate what bidders are most concerned about. For example, if α is 
larger than β, bidders pay more importance to the conditional profit ratio. 
The objective function in (15) is also economically meaningful. It takes a form of Cobb-
Douglas utility functions typically used in economic literature on the consumption of two goods. 
In Cobb-Douglas utility function x1
αx2
β, x1 and x2 are consumption of the two goods and the 
relative size of α to β indicates the relative importance of the goods to consumers (Liu and 
Wang, 2010; Wang et al., 2010). 
With the similar way of the deduction of Proposition 1, we can obtain the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2 In the procurement auction, when bidders use model (15) to represent the 
relative importance of the conditional profit ratio to the work force continuity, a symmetric 















    
                                        (16) 
 
Remark 2 Model (7) is a special case of our model (15) for α =β=1/2, since both of the two 
objective functions in (7) and (15) are equivalent for α =β=1/2. 
Remark 3 The bidders' preference over the bidding criteria has a significant effect on the 
selection of the bid markup. By (16), the larger β implies that bidders set the lower bid markup. 
Therefore, Proposition 2 is in accordance with intuition: the larger β is, the more emphasis 




Based on the two bidding criteria of the conditional profit ratio and the work force continuity, 
this short paper modifies the model in Lai et al. (2002) and presents explicit expression of an 
equilibrium bid markup strategy in a procurement auction. 
In the real-world situation, however, bidders often face multiple bidding criteria which 
conflict with each other. Therefore, it is indispensable for bidders to weigh the relative 
importance of one criterion to another in the determination of a most preferred bid markup. In 
this short paper, Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to make tradeoffs between the 
conditional profit ratio and the work force continuity, and a new bid markup selection making 
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model is developed. Under the new model, the relative importance of a bidding criterion to 
another has significant effect on the selection of the equilibrium bid markup strategy, which is 
accordance with our intuition. 
Besides, comparisons are made between the result in this short paper and the 
corresponding one in Seydel and Olson (1990). It is shown that the result in continuous 




This work was supported partly by the National Natural Science Foundation of China 





[1] Chang S.A., “Networked online auctions: agent behavior and strategic gain”, International Journal 
of Information Processing and Management, vol.2, no.2, pp.59-68, 2011. 
[2] Choi J.H., Ahn H. and Han I., “Utility-based double auction mechanism using genetic algorithms”, 
Expert Systems with Applications, vol.34, no.1, pp.150-158, 2008. 
[3] Kim Y.S., “Maximizing sellers' welfare in online auction by simulating bidders' proxy bidding 
agents”, Expert Systems with Applications, vol.32,vno.2, pp.289-298, 2007. 
[4] Lai K.K., Liu S.L. and Wang S.Y., “Bid markup selection models by use of multiple criteria”, 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, vol.49, no.2, pp.155-160, 2002. 
[5] Liu S.L. and Wang M.X., “Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function”, 
Economics Letters, vol.107, no.1, pp.1-3, 2010. 
[6] Maskin E. and Riley J.G., “Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers”, Econometrica, vol.52, no.6, 
pp.1473-1518, 1984. 
[7] Matthews S.A., “Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes”, Journal of Economic 
Theory, vol.30, no.2, pp.370-400, 1983. 
[8] Matthews S., “Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: a buyer's point of view”, Econometrica, 
vol.55, no3, pp.636-646, 1987. 
[9] McAfee R.P. and McMillan J., “Auctions and bidding”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.25, 
no.2, pp.699-738, 1987. 
[10] Milgrom P., “Auctions and bidding: a primer”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.2, no.3, 
pp.3-22, 1989. 
[11] Myerson R.B., “Optimal auction design”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol.6, no.1, pp.58-
73, 1981. 
[12] Riley J.G. and Samuelson W.F., “Optimal auctions”, American Economic Review, vol.71, no.3, 
pp.381-392, 1981. 
[13] Seydel J. and Olson D.L., “Bids considering multiple criteria”, Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, vol.116, no.4, pp.609-623, 1990. 
[14] Sohangir S. and Seyyedi M.A., “A service binding method using forward auction algorithm”, 
International Journal of Information Processing and Management, vol.2, no.2, pp.1-7, 2011. 
[15] Wang M.X., Liu S.L., Wang S.Y and Lai, K.K., “A weighted product method for bidding 
strategies in multi-attribute auctions”, Journal of Systems Science & Complexity, vol.23, no.1, 
pp.194-208, 2010. 
[16] Wang M.X., Liu S.L. and Wang S.Y, “The simple economics of bid criteria”, Applied Economics 
Letters, vol.18, no.6, pp.591-594, 2011. 
 
An Equilibrium Bid Markup Strategy 
Mingxi Wang, Shulin Liu, Shouyang Wang, Luis Coladas Uria
13
